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PETITION
Appellant Lenore M. Gill hereby petitions the Supreme Co
for a rehearing of her appeal upon the basis of the points
supporting arguments below.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
AND STATUTE
On the date this appeal was argued and submitted to
Court, June 10f 1985, the Constitution of Utah, Article VI
§2, provided in part:
The Supreme Court shall consist of five
judges, ... . If a justice of the Supreme
Court shall be disqualified from sitting in
a cause before said court, the remaining
judges shall call a district judge to sit
with them on the hearing of such cause.
Article VIII, §2, was amended effective July 1, 1985,
provide, in part:
The Supreme Court shall be the highest
court and shall consist of at least five
justices. ... If a justice of the Supreme
Court is disqualified or otherwise unable to
participate in a cause before the court, the
chief justice, or in the event the chief
justice
is disqualified
or
unable to
participate, the remaining justices, shall
call an active judge from an appellate court
or the district court to participate in the
cause.
U.C.A. §78-2-3 (1953) provides:
The concurrence of three justices of
the Supreme Court is necessary to pronounce
a judgment; if three do not concur, the case
must be reheard.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This

is

an

appeal

from

the

property-distribution

and

attorney's fee parts of a final judgment entered by the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah, in a divorce action.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The
follows:

facts

relevant

to

the

petition

presented

are

as

The appeal was argued to the five justices of this

Court and submitted for their decision on June 10, 1985.

Prior

to that date no withdrawal or recusal of any justice had been
entered in the Court's docket. During oral argument the parties
were not made aware that any justice would not participate in
the case.

The Court's written decision affirming the judgment

and order

of

the trial

court was filed on April 29, 1986.

Justice Durham did not participate in that decision.

Appellant

was given no notice that Justice Durham would disqualify herself
and that her appeal would be decided by only four justices.
Those justices who participated in the case were divided evenly
between the Court's decision and the dissenting opinion.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Because

Mrs. Gill did not

consent

to her

appeal being

decided by four justices, the Court's failure to call another
judge

to

participate

upon

Justice

Durham's

disqualification

contravenes the mandatory language of the Constitution of Utah,
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Article VIII, §2.
outcome

That failure has materially effected the

of this appeal

to Mrs. Gill's substantial

prejudice

since the remaining members divided evenly between the Court's
affirming decision and the dissent*
could have resulted in reversal.

The vote of a fifth judge
In addition, U.C.A. §78-2-3

(1953) requires that a case be reheard if three justices do not
concur in pronouncing a judgment.
The Court's affirmance of the order below impliedly rejects
a legal principle recognized under existing Utah case law as
being

applicable

to

contempt

proceedings.

The

dissenting

justices urge acknowledgment of that principle of law in ruling
on this appeal.

Resolution of this divergence of opinion on a

point of law will be critical to the proper functioning of our
trial courts.
Lastly, facts central to an equitable assessment of the
trial judge's ruling have been misapprehended by the Court in
reaching its decision.

POINTS OF PETITION
AND SUPPORTING ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT'S DECISION WAS
RENDERED CONTRARY TO
UTAH'S CONSTITUTION.

Utah's Constitution, Article VIII, §2 [hereinafter

,,

§2,,1,

requires that if a member of the Supreme Court is disqualified
or unable to participate

in a cause another qualified judge
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shall

be

called

to

sit and

justices in that cause.

participate

with

the

remaining

The term "disqualification" has been

interpreted to include personal interest in the particular case
on the part of a justice in addition to illness or disability.
Critchlow

v. Monson, 102 Utah 378, 131 P.2d

794, 800

(Utah

1942); In re Thompson's Estate, 72 Utah 18, 86, 269 P. 103
(1927)

(disqualification may even include a member's death).

Disqualification may be accomplished by withdrawal or recusal on
a

judge's

own

motion

whether

disqualification is disclosed.

or

not

the

basis

of

the

Utah's Code of Judicial Conduct,

Cannon 3, C. and D.
Notwithstanding the mandatory language of §2 concerning the
calling

of

a substitute

judge

justice, this Court has stated

to

sit

in the absence of a

in dicta that a case may be

submitted to the remaining members of the Court for decision if
the parties consent.

In re Thompson's Estate, supra, at 86.

In

that case a substitute district judge was called to sit but no
challenge to his participation was made until after the decision
was rendered.
without

Because the case had been argued and submitted

objection

to

the

district

judge's participation

the

respondent was found to have consented to the composition of the
court.

IcL at 89.

The necessity
manner

was

for making such an objection in a timely

reemphasized

Newsom, 579 P.2d

1316

in Shippers' Best
(Utah 1978).

Express, Inc. v.

There it was argued on
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rehearing that Retired Justice Henroid's participation in the
case for Justice Hall had been improper.

This Court held:

Pursuant
to
the
statute
[U.C.A.
§49-7-5.7 (Supp. 1967)1, Justice Henroid was
invited to sit on this case.
His vote in
the matter was not needed as the decision
was a per curiam opinion with two of the
five justices concurring in the result. Not
only was his vote immaterial, but the
appellant is not in a position to complain
about it for he did not object when the
appeal was heard and decided by the Court as
then constituted.
He only complains about
the membership of the Court after the
decision was rendered partially against him.
579 P.2d at 1318.
At

footnote

3 of

the Shippers1

Best

decision

the procedure

employed in an earlier case before this Court in securing the
parties1 consent to the participation of a retired judge and a
district court judge was recounted as follows:
The parties appeared for argument; the
Chief Justice announced the disqualification
of two Justices, named those selected to sit
in their stead, and asked and obtained for
the parties through their counsel, the
approval of the court as so constituted.
579 P.2d at 1318.
Mrs. Gill's case was argued and submitted to this Court en
banc.

Justice Durham's withdrawal was not announced when the

parties appeared for argument and no recusal had been entered in
the clerk's docket prior to that time.

The first notice Mrs.

Gill had that Justice Durham would not participate in the case
was when she received the Court's written decision.
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Given these circumstances and under the facts of the In re
Thompson's Estate and Shippers1 Best cases it cannot be said
that Mrs. Gill

submitted

justices by consent.

her

case to a panel of only four

She was given no opportunity to object

and, thereforef did not waive the constitutional right to have
her case decided by a full Court.

She would not have given such

consent for two principal reasons:

her appellant's burden of

persuasion would have increased by the proportionate difference
between three votes of five and three votes of four; andf she
would have risked the very thing that has occurred/
50/50

split

among

the

participating

justices

i.e., a

resulting

in

affirmance of the order below.
A rehearing is appropriate when a member of a court dies
after submission of the case and before a decision is rendered
leaving the remaining justices divided.
F.51

(5th Cir. 1914).

(death may
found

to

constitute
be

necessary

James v. Clements, 217

C.f., In re Thompson's Estate, supra,
"disqualification").
where

a

decision

A
did

rehearing was
not

have

the

concurrence of the number of judges required by the state's
constitution.

See: Denver & R.G.R. Co. v. Burchard, 35 Colo.

539, 86 P.749, 755 (1906) where it was stated:
This case was argued and submitted
prior to April, 1905. It was decided on May
1, 1905.
April 5, 1905, the Old Supreme
Court, consisting of three judges, ceased to
exist, and on and from April 5, 1905, the
constitutional Supreme Court consisted of
seven judges, and was controlled by the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-6-

Constitution as amended.
After April 5,
1905/ no solid constitutional decision could
be rendered by the court unless concurred in
by at least three judges.
The former
opinion handed down herein was concurred in
by but two judges, the decision was not in
conformity with constitutional requirements,
and, not being such, was a sufficient reason
for ordering a rehearing before the full
bench.
Although

the

Burchard

court
opinion,

sustained

the

former

argument

that

the

constitutional

railroad

sitting

e*n

in doing
company's

banc
so

it

on

rehearing

rejected

inclusion

of

the
the

vote-concurrence point as an additional ground

for rehearing was untimely, saying:
[Tlhe original opinion, being on its face in
plain violation of the Constitution, was a
nullity.
The court was without power to
hand down a decision concurred in by only
two justices. The court would have ordered
a rehearing on its own motion.
86 P. at 755.
Mrs. Gill does not cite Burchard to suggest the decision in
her case is a nullity.

However, she does contend that she has

been denied the constitutional right to have her case decided by
a five-member Court without her consent and that for this reason
she can request the Court's decision be set aside.

Accordingly,

by this petition Mrs. Gill invokes the constitutional mandate of
§2. Had that mandate been observed,

the stalemate which has

occurred on this appeal would have been prevented.
"To make an application for a rehearing

is a matter of

right, ...," and when the court has overlooked some statute or
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decisionf

or

materially

has

misapplied

affects the

properly applied for.
129 P. 619 (1912) •
case.

or

overlooked

something

result of an appeal, a

which

rehearing

is

Cummings v. Nielsen, 42 Utah 157, 172-73,
The mandate of §2 was overlooked in this

That oversight has materially affected the result of this

appeal in that the vote of a fifth judge may have produced a
majority for reversal of the lower court's order.

It follows

that Mrs. Gill has been substantially prejudiced in that she has
been deprived of the opportunity to prevail.

II.

A REHEARING IS REQUIRED
BY U.C.A. §78-2-3 (1953).

In the Shippers' Best decision on rehearing the dissent's
citation of U.C.A. §78-2-3 (1953) as authority to be applied in
resolving

the petition for

statement:
judgment.
P.2d

at

"That

section

rehearing was rejected with this
applied

to

the pronouncing

of

a

In this casef the judgment has been pronounced." 579
1318.

The

judgment

to

which

Justice

Ellett

was

Appellant's research revealed no Utah decision by an evenly
divided four-justice court.
Howeverf in those cases where a
fifth sitting judge's participation has been challenged the
decisions on rehearing have turned, in part, on whether his vote
was material to the outcome. See: Shippers' Besty supra, (per
curiam decision where retired justice's vote was immaterial) and
People v. Tidwell, 5 Utah 88, 12 P. 638 (1886) (district judge's
vote was sole dissent from majority; original opinion at 4 Utah
506.)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

referring was the main opinion's affirmance of the lower court's
judgment and verdict.
In the present case the Court has also affirmed the lower
court's judgment and order.
"judgment."

Because

In so doing it has pronounced a

this

judgment

was

not

based

upon

the

concurrence of three justices a rehearing of Mrs. Gill's appeal
is required by the express language of U.C.A. 78-2-3 (1953) , to
wit:
The concurrence of three justices of
the Supreme Court is necessary to pronounce
a judgment; if three do not concur the case
must be reheard.
This statute, formerly Comp. Laws Utah 1917f §1644, was
cited

in

In

re

Thompson's

Estate

in

connection

with

the

constitutional provision of §2 that a majority of the Supreme
Court's justices shall constitute a quorum to hold court and
render a decision.
§2

deleted

declared
repealed

this

Id. at 85.
majority

unconstitutional,
or

changed.

Although the 1985 amendment of

requirement
U.C.A.

Accordingly,

except

§78-2-3
by

when

laws

are

(1953)

was

not

statute

this

Court's

judgment affirming the order below is required to be set aside
and Mrs. Gill's appeal reheard.
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III.

RESOLUTION OF THE COURT'S DIVERGENCE
ON THE LEGAL ISSUE PRESENTED BY REHEARING
WILL AVOID INCONSISTENT RULINGS IN OUR
TRIAL COURTS.

By affirming the trial court which denied relief to Mrs.
Gill because it found her husband did not intentionally violate
its

restraining

principle

of

order

law

this Court has impliedly

recognized

in Gunnison

rejected the

Irrigation

Peterson, 74 Utah 460, 280 P. 715 (1929), namely:

Co. v.

that intent

to violate a restraining order is irrelevant in a civil contempt
proceeding in which damages are sought to indemnify a party for
resulting loss.

At the least, the Court's decision has cast

doubt upon the continuing validity of this legal rule in cases
of the kind involved in this appeal.
Restraining orders and injunctions are entered

in cases

where disadvantaged parties must be protected or the status quo
must be maintained pending a plenary hearing.
proceedings

in

equity

such

as

These are often

partnership

dissolutions,

receiverships, trustee-cestui disputes and, most significantly
due

to

their

number, domestic

relations matters.

When no

imprisonment or fine is sought to be imposed for violation of
such an order, the consideration of a no-intent plea serves to
frustrate the equitable purposes envisioned by the order and
contributes to cavalier attitudes of obedience to court orders
and, ultimately, to disrespect for the judicial system.

In

domestic relations cases the ability of our district courts to
effectively enforce orders of the broad variety they must make

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-10-

would be impeded if in show cause and contempt proceedings it
was always necessary to determine whether a party "intended" to
do, or not to dof something given the existence of a valid court
order compelling or restraining the party's doing of that very
thing.
In this case the Court's decision and the dissent's opinion
could not be more diametrically opposed on this legal issue.
Chief Justice Hall

impliedly holds that Mr. Gill's intent to

violate the restraining order was relevant by this statement:
"[A] canvas of the record fails to disclose any evidence that
clearly

preponderates

contrary

to the findings of the trial

court that defendant did not hide or secret marital assets in
violation of the court's order or the rights of plaintiff."
Neither

does the Court

principle of law.

find

the trial

judge misapplied

any

Whereas, Justice Zimmerman's dissent states:

"The Utah courts have long recognized that civil contempt for
violation of a court order or injunction requires no intent,"
and

"the

evidence

trial
when

court
it

acted

refused

contrary

to

find

to

the

the

uncontradicted

injunction

had

been

violated and to compensate Mrs. Gill accordingly."
This

divergence

participating
conduct

of

members

show-cause

of

opinion—in
concur—will

and

contempt

which

the Court's other

undoubtedly
proceedings

courts leading to inconsistent results.

effect

the

in our trial

Under our system of

government this Court is charged with the duty of clarifying and
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pronouncing the law for the instruction of Utah's citizens and
courts*

A

rehearing before a full Court will satisfy that

charge by resolving the confusion created by this divergence.

IV.
Appellant

THE COURT'S RULING IS BASED UPON
A MISAPPREHENSION OP THE FACTS.

suggests

that

the

Court's

assessment

of

the

equities in this case, as reflected by the facts recited in its
decision, was derived from a misapprehension of the true facts
concerning Defendant's operation of the businesses in question
and his unilateral

control

and disposition of the Fleetwayf

Inc., assets.
The uncontroverted record facts establish the following:
When the parties separated on September 6, 1979, the Gill's
Tire Market business was defunct (R.420) and before the end of
1979 it was in bankruptcy (R.186-87, 420-21).
business was

shut down the same week

The Fleetway Tire

the parties

separated

(Exhibit P-7; R.278-79) and it never resumed operations.

So,

neither at the time the parties separated, nor at the time the
divorce complaint was filed ten days later, nor at the time the
restraining order was entered against Defendant on October 29,
1979, nor at the time the divorce decree was entered on January
22, 1980, was he operating either of the businesses or making a
living therefrom.
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After

Fleetway

was

closed

in September

1979, Defendant

stored the idle assets and equipment of that business at various
locations

in Salt Lake

County

(R.205, 278-79, 296, 385-86)

unknown to Mrs. Gill. They were not used again until October
1980, a year after the restraining order had been entered/ at
which time Defendant opened the Tire City business (R.205, 210,
365-69).

His unilateral use and disposition of those assets was

the subject of Mrs. Gill's discovery from the outset of the
divorce

action

notwithstanding

which
her

discovery

he

evaded

and

disregarded

repeated applications and motions to the

court for his compliance.
Contrary to the Court's recited understanding, the Gill's
Tire Market and Fleetway, Inc., businesses were not ongoing and
the parties were not dependent upon them for their livelihood
during the period after their separation and up to the entry of
the divorce decree.

At the time the restraining order was

entered it was not contemplated that Defendant would continue to
operate them.

Accordingly, it was not reasonable to conclude

either that Mrs. Gill was aware of her ex-husband's business
revenues or that she knew of his use of the Fleetway assets in
his losing Tire City venture.
Lastly,
contention
disposed
proof.

the

focal

that her

issue

husband

at
had

of marital assets.

trial

was not

Mrs. Gill's

"intentionally"

secreted or

She assumed no such burden of

Rather, the difficult fact issues to which her evidence
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was directed were the identificationf location and valuation of
the Fleetwayf

Inc.r assets which had been under her husband's

exclusive control at all times after their separation. If any
statement was made during trial regarding Defendant's "intent11
such

reference

was

made

only

to

emphasize

what

Mrs, Gill

perceived to be the equities supporting her case and not by way
of an acknowledgment that it was a fact required to be proved by
her.

CONCLUSION
For the constitutional, statutory and equitable reasons set
out above Appellant's appeal should be reheard.

COUNSEL'S CERTIFICATION
By

his

subscription

to

this

Petition

for

Rehearing

Appellant's counsel certifies that it is presented in good faith
and not for delay.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this I TTSay Of May 1986.
!

L.
GARY L.

>

P«
PftXTC

""Vv

X

Attorney for Appellant
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I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing

Appellant's

Respondent this I +y

Petition

for

Rehearing were

served on

day of May 1986 by depositing the same in

the U.S. Mails, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:

Dwight L. King, Esq.
DWIGHT L. KING & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
2121 South State Streets
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